Federal tax policy provides a broad array of incentives for energy investment. I review those policies and construct estimates of marginal effective tax rates for different energy capital investments as of 2007. Effective tax rates vary widely across investment classes. I then consider investment in wind generation capital and regress investment against a user cost of capital measure along with other controls. I find that wind investment is strongly responsive to changes in tax policy. Based on the coefficient estimates the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital is in the range of -1 to -2. I also demonstrate that the federal production tax credit plays a key role in driving wind investment over the past eighteen years.
Introduction
Investment in new energy capital infrastructure is much in the news these days.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 included over $60 billion in funds for clean energy investments. If passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 will implement a cap and trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissionsnearly 80 percent of which are associated with energy production or consumption -and implement a new mandate for renewable electricity with 20 percent to be provided by renewable sources by 2020.
1 New capital investments are critical to the Administration's goals of reducing our reliance on petroleum products and in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The tax code has historically been a significant policy instrument for shaping energy decisions in the marketplace. Much attention has been paid to the magnitude of federal dollars supporting different energy sources. A recent study by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2008a), for example, estimates that roughly two-thirds of tax-subsidies for energy production were received by producers of fossil fuels in 1999 in contrast to one-third for producers of renewable energy. By 2007 the share going to renewable producers had risen to nearly forty percent while the share going to fossil fuel producers had fallen to less than fifty percent.
While much is known about the number and dollar value of tax benefits, surprisingly little is known about how the tax code affects investment in energy capital.
This paper seeks to fill that gap. I begin by reviewing key energy tax code provisions in the next section. In section III I construct measures of the effective tax rate on various 1 Up to five percent can be provided through energy efficiency improvements.
forms of energy capital. The following section provides an empirical analysis of investment in wind power taking tax considerations into account. Section V concludes.
Before turning to these issues it may be useful to provide a bit of an overview on U.S. energy production and our energy capital infrastructure. Figure 1 shows the distribution of domestic energy production by fuel source for 2007. Domestic production of energy totaled 71.5 quadrillion BTUs (or quads) in that year. Roughly one-third of the energy we produce is coal -the United States is second only to China in world coal production. Natural gas accounts for just over one-quarter and crude oil (including natural gas plant liquids) just under one-fifth. Solar, geothermal and wind account for just one percent of U.S. energy production. Table 1 provides some numbers on the value of fixed assets related to energy production in 2007. The infrastructure related to energy production amounted to nearly $2.9 trillion. This amounts to twelve percent of the value of the net stock of nonresidential fixed assets in that year. 3 The bulk of energy related assets are structureselectrical generation facilities and mining exploration, shafts and wells. 
II. Review of key energy tax code provisions
Energy is subject to taxes and at the same time the beneficiary of various tax deductions and credits at both the federal and state level. In this section, I review the current treatment of energy in the tax code.
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A.
Federal Tax Provisions
To begin, income earned in the production or distribution of energy is subject to the U.S. income tax. Most energy-related income is taxed through the corporate income tax with a top federal marginal tax rate of 35 percent. Table 2 indicates the share of assets taxed through the corporate income tax in various energy-related industries. 5 For the mining, utilities, and petroleum and coal manufacturing sectors, the vast bulk of assets are subject to corporate income tax. 
Depreciation
Under the current tax code, capital assets are depreciated according to the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) with recovery periods ranging from 3 to 39 years. Most capital is depreciated using a declining balance method at either 200 percent (3, 5, 7 , and 10 year property) or 150 percent (15 and 20 year property) with the option to shift to straight-line depreciation at whichever point it becomes advantageous to do so. Assuming firms switch to straight-line depreciation at the point where straight-line provides a larger deduction than declining balance, the two key parameters are the recovery period of the asset and the declining balance deduction rate.
Tax depreciation effectively reduces the purchase price of an asset. If z is the present discounted value of the stream of depreciation deductions per dollar for an asset and τ the corporate tax rate, then tax depreciation reduces the price of the asset from one to 
Depreciation and Fossil Fuel Production
Depreciation of assets in the production of fossil fuels (oil and gas drilling and coal mining) deserve additional attention. Chief among the depreciation preferences are percentage depletion and the ability to expense intangible drilling costs. As noted in Metcalf (2007) these preferences are less generous than they have been historically but they continue to be significant. A bit of background will help in understanding these tax benefits.
Capital investments to develop oil and gas production sites fall into one of three categories for federal tax purposes. Costs incurred in finding and acquiring the rights to oil or gas are treated as depletable property and are written off over the life of the oil or gas site. These include exploration costs to identify promising sites as well as the cost of up-front (or bonus) bids to acquire sites. Once a site is identified and purchased, its oil or 7 Exploratory wells continue to have high failure rates. In 2008, 32 percent of exploratory wells were dry holes and 8 percent of development wells were dry holes. But only 5,600 exploratory wells were drilled that year compared to over 50,100 development wells. Roughly 34,000 development wells were drilled in 1960 with a dry hole rate of 25 percent. However, 11,700 exploratory wells were drilled with over 80 percent of them being dry holes. Data are taken from the Energy Information Administration's website http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_wellend_s1_a.htm accessed on July 16, 2009.
gas enters a firm's proven reserves. As natural resources are extracted from booked reserves, the value of those reserves is diminished. Cost depletion allows a firm to write off depletable costs as the reserve is drawn down. As an example imagine a field that contains two million barrels of proven reserves of oil with exploration and purchase costs of $10 million. Under cost depletion, the firm is allowed to write off the $10 million cost as oil is drilled. Thus if the firm pumps 100,000 barrels of oil from the field in the first year, it would be allowed cost depletion of $500,000 since the amount pumped equals 5 percent of the proven reserves.
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As an alternative to cost depletion, independent oil, gas, and coal producers are allowed to take percentage depletion. 9 Rather than take a depletion deduction based on actual costs, the firm is allowed to take a certain percentage of revenue as a deduction.
The current rate for percentage depletion is 15 percent for oil and gas and 10 percent for coal. Percentage depletion is allowed on production up to 1,000 barrels of average daily production of oil (or its equivalent for natural gas) for the company. In addition, the depletion allowance cannot exceed 100 percent of taxable income from the property (50 percent for coal) and 65 percent of taxable income from all sources. 10 Continuing with the example above, assume an independent firm owns this oil reserve and sells the 100,000 barrels of oil pumped in the first year for $60 per barrel. Assuming no taxable income limitations, the firm could take a deduction for 15 percent of the revenue from the sale of the oil or $900,000. If the firm were to sell the entire reserve of oil at $60 per 8 Geological and geophysical costs may be amortized over two years (seven years for the majors). 9 Independent producers are defined as producers who do not engage in refining or retail operations. EPACT increased the amount of oil a company could refine before it was deemed to engage in refining for this purpose from 50,000 to 75,000 barrels per day. 10 Amounts in excess of the 65 percent rule can be carried forward to subsequent tax years.
barrel its cumulative depletion allowance would be $18 million, eighty percent greater than the depletable costs of the field. (Table A6 ) potentially eligible to take percentage depletion.
Once a property has been identified, the firm incurs significant costs to develop the site. These costs, which might include site improvement, construction costs, wages, drilling mud, fuel, and other expenses, are called intangible drilling costs (or IDCs).
Intangible drilling costs are all costs for which no salvage value is possible. Typically non-capital costs associated with developing a capital asset are depreciated over the life of the asset under the uniform capitalization rules. In the energy sector intangible drilling costs may be expensed by independent producers. Integrated producers may expense 70 percent of IDCs and write the remainder off over a five year period.
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The last capital expense category is the drilling equipment itself. This is written off over a seven year period using double declining balance depreciation rules. 
Production and Investment Tax Credits
The federal tax code includes a number of production and investment tax credits on fossil, alternative, nuclear, and renewable fuels. These are included as part of the general business credit (GBC) and subject to AMT limitations. Carlson and Metcalf (2008) 
b. Other Production Tax Credits
The 2005 energy act provided a production tax credit for electricity produced at nuclear power plants (section 45J). Qualifying plants are eligible for a 1.8¢ per kWh production tax credit for eight years up to an annual limit of $125 million per 1,000 megawatts of installed capacity. This limit will be binding for a nuclear power plant with a capacity factor of 80 percent or higher. The law places an aggregate limit of 6,000 megawatts of capacity eligible for this credit. Coke and coke gas producers are eligible for a $3 per barrel equivalent tax credit under section 45K of the tax code. This is the last vestige of the previous section 29 nonconventional oil production tax credit and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2009. credit is phased out as the section 29 reference oil price exceeds $28 in 1990 dollars ($37.44 for 2005) . At current prices, producers cannot take this credit.
d. Investment Tax Credits

e. Section 40 Alcohol and Biodiesel Fuels Credit
The Energy Policy Act of 1978 included an exemption from the motor fuels excise tax for alcohol and alcohol blended fuels, generically known as gasohol. 16 The
Windfall Profits Tax allowed an immediate tax credit in lieu of the exemption. 17 The credit was set at a rate to be equivalent to the tax exemption. The alcohol fuel mixture credit is currently $.45 per gallon of ethanol in gasohol and $.60 for other alcohol based fuels (excluding petroleum based alcohol fuels). In addition small producers may take a credit of $.10 per gallon. The 2005 Energy Policy Act increased the small producer production capacity limit from 30 million to 60 million gallons per year.
The American Jobs Creation Act also added section 40A to the code to provide an income tax credit for biodiesel fuels at a rate of $.50 per gallon of bio-diesel (other than agri-biodiesel) and $1.00 for agri-biodiesel. Like the alcohol fuel tax credit, it is first applied to motor fuel excise tax payments with the excess added to the general business credit.
B. State Tax Provisions
Most states levy a corporate income tax with top rates that varied from two to twelve percent in 2006. In addition thirty-five states impose severance taxes on mineral extraction in their states. Table 3 lists the top fifteen states in severance tax collections ranked by amount of collections in fiscal year 2008. Alaska, Texas, and Oklahoma lead 16 Originally, the law provided a full exemption from the then $.04 per gallon tax. As the motor fuels excise tax was raised over time, the exemption did not keep pace with the excise tax rate. See General Accounting Office (1997) for an early chronology of events related to this tax exemption. 17 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 subsequently eliminated the tax exemption in favor of the tax credit.
the list and account for two-thirds of total U.S. severance tax collections in that year.
These three states were among the top five oil producing states in 2008 (the other two states are Louisiana and California). Wyoming is a significant oil and gas producing state as well as the largest coal producing state in the country. While I do not have detailed data breaking out severance tax collections by fuel, it appears that oil and gas are responsible for the lion's share of revenue.
The fifteen states in Table 3 account for over 95 percent of severance tax collections in 2008. For many of these states severance taxes account for a large fraction of total state tax revenues. In my analysis below of the impact of taxes on energy investment I take the state corporate tax into account. I use an average tax rate of 6.6 percent which when combined with the federal corporate tax rate of 35 percent gives a total corporate tax rate of 39.3 percent. 18 I assume that severance taxes reduce the price paid to owners of land on which the taxed energy sources are found. This follows from the inelasticity of supply of reserves and the ease of substitutability among consumers across different state supplies of coal, oil, or natural gas.
III. Effective Tax Rates on Energy Capital Investments
As the previous section makes clear the treatment of energy in the tax code is complex. In this section I construct a summary measure of the tax code's provisions.
The tax literature contains a number of summary measures of the tax code and two measures are particularly relevant for thinking about capital investment: the Hall Jorgenson (1967) user cost of capital and marginal effective tax rates (see King and Fullerton (1984) for a treatment of this latter measure). The first statistic measures the required marginal product of capital that a firm must receive in order to pay its marginal taxes and provide a required return to investors. Assuming declining marginal product of capital, a higher user cost of capital is associated with lower demand for capital by a firm.
The latter measure is a transformation of the user cost measure that provides the same information in the form of a tax rate. While either measure can be useful for empirical work, the latter is more easily interpreted and so I report marginal effective tax rate measures in this section.
Specifically I construct effective tax rates on capital investments in energy
infrastructure. An effective tax rate measures the difference in the before and after-tax return on a marginal investment relative to its before-tax return. More precisely, the before-tax return is the return an investment must earn in order to cover its cost, pay the required return to investors and to pay taxes on the project. The after-tax return is the return that savers expect to receive after taxes on marginal investments.
Following the terminology in Congressional Budget Office (2005) , let ρ be the real before-tax return on the marginal investment for a particular capital asset category and r the real return paid to investors. The effective tax rate is defined as
Thus, if savers are prepared to accept seven percent on an investment after tax (r) and the project must earn ten percent in order to cover depreciation, taxes, and required payments to investors ( ρ ), the effective tax rate is 30 percent
Effective tax rates focus on the marginal cost of funding investments rather than on project cost. In particular, it focuses on the cost of a break-even investment. Because they summarize the many provisions of the tax code that affect the returns to capital investment, effective tax rates are frequently used to consider how the tax system affects capital investment. This is a particularly salient issue given the capital investment needs of energy infrastructure in the United States as noted in the introduction.
I follow the methodology of Congressional Budget Office ( (2005, 2006) ) to construct effective tax rates for energy capital. My measures differ from those reported in the CBO reports in two ways. First, I analyze assets at a more disaggregated level than is done in those reports. Second, I take into account more provisions of the tax code than do those reports. In particular the CBO studies do not account for energy-specific production or investment tax credits or for tax rules specific to the oil and gas industry. I begin with a brief overview of the construction of effective tax rates. Readers seeking a fuller description should read Congressional Budget Office (2006) or any of the references cited therein. I then discuss how I modify the standard ETR measure for energy-specific tax provisions.
Ignoring energy specific deductions and credits, the required before-tax return is equal to
Equation (2) says that the real before-tax return equals the user cost of capital (ucc) less the economic rate of depreciation. The parameter r in equation (2) is the real corporate discount rate measured as ( )
. The discount rate is a weighted average of the real after-tax cost of borrowing where i is the corporate borrowing rate, π is the expected inflation rate, τ is the corporate tax rate, d is the share of investment financed by debt, and E is the real return on equity. Assets are assumed to depreciate at an exponential rate with the rate of decay equal to δ . The present value of tax depreciation is given by z and depends on tax rules specific to each asset. Equation (2) makes clear that either the user cost of capital or the effective tax rate measure is a summary statistic for the tax code's various provisions and their impact on marginal investments. In the next section I report regressions using the user cost of capital measure as it is less sensitive to small changes in the firm's discount rate. In this section I focus on the effective tax rate measure as it is a more easily interpretable measure.
In some cases, I compute effective tax rates for investments that are composed of different types of capital each of which faces its own effective tax rate. In those cases I construct before-tax returns for each capital component and compute the weighted before-tax return for the investment weighting by the share of the component in the total investment cost.
A key element in the taxation of capital assets is the tax treatment of depreciation.
Let z equal the present discounted value of the stream of depreciation deductions assuming particular tax rules for an asset. If D t is the amount of depreciation allowed in year t for an asset with initial basis of 1 and a recovery period of T years, then z equals The present discounted value of depreciation deductions is equal to the tax rate times z (assuming the tax rate does not change over the life of the asset). Thus, the effective after-tax purchase price of an asset is equal to z ⋅ −τ 1 times the cost of the asset. Below, I will show how the effective price is affected by energy-specific tax rules. The formula for the before-tax return in equation 2 needs to be modified to account for production and investment tax credits as well as for percentage depletion for oil and gas drilling. Investment tax credits at rate κ are a straightforward modification. depending on the particular source of oil. While the price of a barrel of oil is straightforward to measure, the appropriate measure of operating profit per barrel of oil is not. One approach to measuring operating profit might be to take the oil price and subtract production costs (finding and lifting costs). The domestic first purchase price for oil was roughly $60 in 2006. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (2007), production costs were roughly $25 per barrel. This suggests a mark-up of 1.71. Adelman (1995) cautions that the standard measure of finding costs (the sum of exploration and development expenditures divided by oil and gas reserves added (in oil equivalents)) is a flawed measure. As Adelman notes, exploration adds knowledge while development adds reserves. The knowledge from exploration may add to reserves at present but may not add to reserves for many years. In addition, the conversion of gas into oil equivalents is not stable over time as it depends on how oil and gas are used as well as their relative prices. The EIA study acknowledges the first problem and addresses this by averaging finding costs over three years.
Alternatively one could simply measure operating profit from firm balance sheets. Table 9 , reports income and expenses for major energy producers. The ratio of revenue to operating income in 2006 was 1.86.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2007),
Based on these two estimates of the mark-up ratio ( μ ), I use a ratio of 1.75 in my calculations below. Table 5 reports the parameters I use in my effective tax rate calculations that are not technology specific. in the drilling and refining of oil as well as in the transport of natural gas.
The first part of Table 6 provides estimates of effective tax rates for electric generation capital. Under current law (column 1), solar thermal and wind capital is subsidized to the greatest extent with effective marginal subsidy rates of 245 and 164 percent respectively. Nuclear power is also heavily subsidized with a subsidy rate of nearly 100 percent. The effective tax rates for coal and gas are substantially higher than for nuclear or renewables. IGCC capital is subsidized while pulverized coal capital faces a positive tax. The major difference here is the 20 percent investment tax credit for new IGCC investments. Finally, coal (PC) and natural gas combined cycle face an effective tax rate very close to the statutory tax rate (39.3 percent accounting for state and federal taxes). The next two columns in Table 6 indicate the impact on effective tax rates of removing the production and investment tax credits (column 2) and replacing accelerated depreciation with economic depreciation. 21 The production or investment tax credits are the most significant source of subsidy -as evidenced by the change in the effective tax rate when the credits are removed. The effective tax rate for wind, for example, rises from -164 percent to -14 percent if economic depreciation replaces accelerated depreciation while it rises to +13 percent if the production tax credit is eliminated. With economic depreciation and no production or investment tax credits, the effective tax rate in all cases equals the statutory tax rate of 39.3 percent. 21 Here the effective tax rate formula uses the exponential economic depreciation rate for tax depreciation rather than approximating it with straight-line depreciation.
The effective tax rate methodology can be used for other types of energy capital.
In the electric utility section, I also construct effective tax rates for transmission and distribution. Transmission lives are allowed a fifteen year recovery period while distribution lines are allowed a twenty year recovery period. The former face an effective tax rate modestly lower than the statutory rate while the latter receive very little in the form of a subsidy.
Effective tax rates in the petroleum sector depend in large part on whether the firms taking the credits are integrated or non-integrated (independent) firms. Independent firms benefit from full expensing of their intangible drilling costs while the integrated firms can only expense 70 percent of their IDCs and must write the rest off over a five year period. In addition, the independents are allowed to take percentage depletion while the integrated firms must use cost depletion.
The effective tax rate on oil drilling equipment depends importantly on the ability to take percentage rather than cost depletion. For independent firms taking percentage depletion, the effective tax rate is -13 percent whereas firms taking cost depletion face effective tax rates of 15 percent. The rate for integrated firms is a bit lower than the effective tax rate on refining capital. The effective tax rate for refining capital assumes the temporary 50 percent expensing provision for capacity additions. This reflects the fact that most new investment in refineries has been in increasing the capacity of existing refineries rather than in building new refineries. 22 In the absence of the temporary expensing provision, the effective tax rate on refinery capital would rise from 19 to 32 percent. The lower tax rate on gathering pipelines relative to other pipelines reflects the 22 The number of operable refineries has been steadily declining from its recent peak of 324 in 1981 to 150 in 2008. Gross inputs to refineries, on the other hand, has increased by nearly twenty percent over this same period. See Table 5 .9 in U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009a).
seven year recovery period for this capital versus the fifteen year recovery period for other pipelines.
The effective tax rate for independent firms taking percentage depletion is sensitive to the ratio of price to operating profit per barrel. Figure 2 shows how the effective tax rate changes as this ratio changes. Percentage depletion drives the effective tax rate down as the oil price relative to per barrel operating profits falls. The rising cost of extracting oil in the United States means that the effective tax rate for independent firms able to take percentage depletion is falling holding other factors constant.
This section has provided current estimates of effective tax rates for energy capital investment taking into account energy-specific provisions of the tax code. What effect do these provisions have on energy investment? In the next section I make a preliminary estimate of the impact by considering the relationship between taxation and investment in wind power. 
IV. Analysis of Wind Investment
In this section I provide an initial analysis of the impact of tax policy on wind investment. I focus on wind because it is the most rapidly growing source of renewable electricity investment in the United States and the perceived importance of the production tax credit in driving that growth. I carry out an econometric analysis of wind investment to measure the impact of the tax code on that investment.
Little empirical work has been carried out to measure the impact of government policy on wind power investment. Kahn and Goldman (1987) Mulder's is the only study I am aware of that empirically estimates investment as a function of tax variables. Renewable sources of electricity account for nearly 11 percent of U.S. capacity.
Of this, nearly 8 percent is conventional hydroelectric power. Wind is the next most significant renewable source accounting for 1.7 percent of total capacity in 2007. Solar generated electricity accounts for 0.1 percent of total capacity. The relative growth rates of renewable and nonrenewable energy have shifted over time. While nonrenewable capacity grew at a more rapid rate than renewable capacity between 1990 and 2007, the opposite is true if we focus on more recent investments. Over the past four years (for which data are available) renewable capacity has grown at nearly three times the growth rate of nonrenewable capacity. Wind is a major factor driving the rapid growth in renewable capacity with an annualized growth rate of nearly thirty percent over the past four years. 
Source: EIA Form 860
The second factor affecting wind investments is Congressional treatment of the federal production tax credit. The shaded regions in the figure above show three periods during which the credit expired. While it was in all cases subsequently reinstated retroactively, investors faced uncertainty over the credit's future.
Another factor driving investment in wind is the consistency and power of the wind at available sites. 27 The median turbine size in both subsamples is similar to the mean. The median number of turbines declines from 16.0 to 15.5 reflecting the fact that fewer projects with large numbers of turbines were initiated in this decade. I constructed user cost of capital and effective tax rate measures for each generator taking into account differences in state corporate tax rates and otherwise using the parameter values from Table 5 . I constructed estimates of overnight cost by fitting a quadratic regression to the cost data reported in Wiser and Bolinger (2008) The first assumes the credit is in force throughout as, ex post, occurred. The second measure zeros out the credit for any project completed during the time period in which the credit lapsed. This reflects investors' concerns that the credit may not be reinstated. Table 9 provides summary information on the user cost of capital and the effective tax rates for wind projects in different states and years. . ucc stands for user cost of capital and etr for effective tax rate. ucc1 and etr1 treat the federal production tax credit as continuously in force during the time period. ucc2 and etr2 treat the credit as not in effect for projects initiated during period the credit lapsed. ucc3 and etr3 are measures assuming no production tax credit at all.
The mean user cost of capital assuming the production tax credit is always in force (as it was ex post) is quite low and ranges from 3.4 to 5.7 percent. This implies highly negative effective tax rates ranging from -1100 to -65 percent. The effective tax rate measures here and below are quite sensitive to the after-tax return available to investors elsewhere and so in regression work below I include the user cost measure as a regressor rather than the effective tax rate.
If investors assume no production tax credit during the period when the credit lapses the user cost and effective tax rate measures (ucc2 and etr2) are slightly higher. I also include estimates of the user cost and tax rate where I ignore the production tax credit. The mean user cost rises by 3.6 percentage points and the mean effective tax rate becomes positive. where i indexes states, j generators, and t years. For states with no wind investment in a given year I set Y to zero. Before presenting results I must address two issues. The first is that unobserved heterogeneity across states is likely to affect both the desirability of investing in a given state as well as some of the potential explanatory variables. One factor that may drive wind investment at the state level is the presence of a state renewable portfolio standard (RPS). An RPS program mandates that local electricity distribution companies (LDC) provide some given percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. Typically this is done by the LDC submitting renewable electricity certificates (RECs) for the required amount of electricity. RECs are issued to renewable electricity generators based on their kWh production. The generators then sell the certificates to LDCs who are required to submit them to the RPS regulator. Selling the RECs provides additional revenue for the generator that adds to the profitability of the project.
As of July 2009 twenty-nine states had mandatory RPS programs and an additional five had RPS goals (non-mandatory). Most of these have been enacted in the past five years. Figure 5 shows the dispersion across states. Most regions have RPS programs in effect with the conspicuous absence of programs in the Southeast. This is perhaps not surprising given the lack of wind resources in this region. Regression results are presented in Table 10 . The latter is now statistically significant. Finally, I report a Tobit regression where I do not include state fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on the user cost variable increases in absolute value by roughly sixty percent. This suggests that failing to control for correlated and unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overestimate of the impact of tax policy on investment.
Summing up, the coefficient on the user cost variable is precisely estimated and robust to regression specification. As a final check I run another set of regressions in which I control for the size of the state (columns (5) - (8) of Table 10 ). Holding other factors constant, one might expect that more wind projects would be put in larger states.
Thus I run regressions in which the dependent variable is installed capacity divided by the area of each state (in thousand square miles).
These regressions are very similar in nature to the regressions on installed capacity. The coefficient on the user cost of capital continues to be precisely estimated while the RPS coefficient is only precisely estimated in the model with region dummies.
Again failing to control for unobserved state-level heterogeneity biases the tax effect in an upward direction (in absolute value).
In addition to the regressions reported in Table 10 , I ran various other regressions not reported here. First I ran a regression in which I include state-specific city gate prices for natural gas and measures of wind power at sites where wind projects are sited (average values for states in years with no investment).
30 After including year effectswhich as we've seen are strongly correlated with investment activity -the coefficient on the natural gas variable has the expected sign but is imprecisely estimated. This is perhaps not surprising since little variation is left in the gas price data after including state and year fixed effects. Let me next turn to a discussion of interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the user cost variable in the Tobit regressions. As I noted above Tobit coefficient estimates cannot be directly compared to OLS estimates. We need to adjust the former to obtain marginal impacts that are comparable to coefficients in the OLS model.
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The adjustment to estimated coefficient can be computed in a number of ways. If I compute the CDF at the mean values of the right hand side variables, I obtain an estimate of the partial effect at the average (PEA). Alternatively I can compute the CDF at the observed values of all the observations and take the average. This is the average partial effect (APE). I report both for the regression in column 2 of Table 10 . The partial effect at the average equals -323.13 while the average partial effect equals -417.33.
These two estimates are both substantially larger than the OLS coefficient estimate on the user cost variable in the first column. In other words, running OLS leads to a large underestimate of the tax impact on investment.
The average user cost of capital in the sample equals 4.57%. This rises to 7.77% if the production tax credit is eliminated. This implies a decline in annual average investment of 10.3 MW if the partial effect at the average is used and 13.4 MW if the average partial effect is used. These declines represent 71 and 92 percent of average investment over the sample suggesting the production tax credit plays a very substantial role in wind investment. Another way to measure the impact of tax policy on investment is to measure the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost. Using the PEA, the elasticity at the mean is -1.01. It equals -1.30 if the APE is used. Either way, the response is large.
The effects are even larger if we control for the size of the state. Using the coefficient estimates from column (6), the average partial effect is -7.18 and the partial effect on average is -8.09. Again these are considerably larger than the OLS impact.
Raising the user cost of capital from 4.57% to 7.77% to model the elimination of the production tax credit implies a decline in investment of 0.23 MW per 1000 square miles based on the APE and 0.25 MW per 1000 square miles based on the PEA. Both of these declines exceed the mean investment per 1000 square miles in the overall sample (0.16 MW per 1000 square miles). The elasticity at the mean is -2.37 using the partial effect at the average and -2.11 using the average partial effects.
With sufficiently strong assumptions we can make a ballpark estimate of the impact of carbon pricing on investment in wind capacity. Consider the year effects as graphed in Figure 6 against natural gas prices. If we make the strong assumption that the year effects are perfectly proxying for natural gas price effects on investment, we can compute an elasticity of capacity investment with respect to natural gas prices. Using the doubling of gas prices between 1990 and 2004 and computing the average partial effect for the marginal impact we obtain an elasticity of investment with respect to the natural gas price of 1.7. A recent analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill by the U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency (2009) suggests that the price of permits in 2020 will be $16.31 (Scenario 2 of the ADAGE run). This will raise natural gas prices by 8.5
percent relative to the reference scenario. Based on my elasticity estimate, this would raise investment in wind capacity by 14 percent. 34 The ADAGE analysis reports an increase in wind capacity investment of 9 percent by 2020. 35 My estimate is higher than the ADAGE estimate but reasonably close given the simplifying assumptions my analysis makes. While my estimate is admittedly very rough, it suggests that wind investment should be quite responsive to carbon pricing.
The regression estimates in this section show a strong response of wind investment to changes in tax policy. They also suggest that production tax credits strongly influence wind investment. These findings support the received wisdom that production tax credits are critically important for the penetration of wind generated electricity in the United States. It also suggests that we will continue to see considerable support for this credit as we approach the end of 2012 and the credit's expiration.
It should be noted, however, that the econometric results here depend critically on the assumptions of the Tobit model in a data set with a large fraction of censored observations. It would be valuable to subject the wind capacity data to more sophisticated econometric techniques to see if the results found here are robust. This is especially the case given the lack of other empirical work measuring the impact of renewable investment behavior to energy tax and climate policy.
V. Conclusion
The federal tax code has historically played a major role in shaping U.S. energy policy. Tax-based subsidies account for nearly two-thirds of all federal financial support for energy markets (U.S. Energy Information Administration (2008a)) in 2007. As 34 Given the estimated standard error on the 2004 year effect and conditional on mean wind capacity, the standard error of the elasticity estimate is 0.6. For an 8.5 percent increase in the price of natural gas this suggests a one standard deviation bracket of this estimated increase in wind capacity between 9.4 and 20.0 percent. 35 They actually report estimates for wind and solar. But the bulk of this capacity is likely to be wind.
detailed in this paper the tax provisions are complex and constantly in flux. Currently, for example, wind developers may receive a production tax credit or investment tax credit or cash rebate comparable to the investment tax credit. The wind credits, however, expire at the end of 2012 in the absence of further government action. At the same time,
Congress is currently considering enacting climate change legislation which will dramatically affect energy markets.
While much as been written on the various tax subsidies to energy, less is known about their impact on investment and production. This paper contributes to that literature by considering the impact of taxes on wind investment. I find that investment in new capacity (measured in megawatts) is strongly influenced by tax policy. The estimated elasticity of capacity investment with respect to the user cost of capital exceeds one.
Moreover the data suggest that much of the current investment in wind can be explained by the production tax credit for wind.
An important question for Congress and the Administration going forward is whether it makes sense to maintain many of the tax-based subsidies if comprehensive climate change legislation is enacted. Elsewhere I have noted a number of problems with a subsidy-based approach to energy policy (see Metcalf (2009a) ). An important question for future research is whether carbon pricing through a cap and trade bill or carbon fee can generate comparable levels of investment as the current tax-based subsidies. While economic principles suggest it should (if designed at comparable levels), it will be important to test this empirically.
